"MAKING BAIL": LIMITING THE USE OF BAIL SCHEDULES AND DEFINING THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF "EXCESSIVE" BAIL

INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Kalief Browder was charged with grand larceny for allegedly stealing a delivery person's car, which was crashed during a joyride in the Bronx. 1 Browder told a reporter from The New Yorker that he had watched his friends take and crash the car, but claimed to have pleaded guilty because he thought he had no defense. 2 The judge placed Browder under probation but avoided admonishing Browder with a criminal record by classifying him under New York's "youthful offender" status. 3 Browder was arrested again eight months later, just before his seventeenth birthday, this time on questionable allegations of assault and robbery. 4 Browder's judge set his bail at 3,000-an amount his family could not pay-and Browder was sent to jail on Riker's Island. 5 Seventy-four days after arriving on Riker's Island, Browder appeared before a judge and pleaded not guilty. 6 The judge found Browder to be in violation of his probation and detained him without * Note, J.D. Candidate, 2018. This Note is dedicated to Judge James L. Watson and Judge "Turn 'em Loose" Bruce Wright. Also to Andrew McCarron, Jacob Levine, Kenneth Gayle, Bill Lynch and the Lynch family as well as my family--all of whom have bailed me out more often than I deserve; I thank them for their inspiration in writing. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law and Policy for their scrupulous editing and invaluable feedback.
1 Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law. 2 Id. 4 Gonnerman, supra note 1. Gonnerman provides an in-depth look at Browder's multi-year confinement on Riker's Island. Browder was held for three years and then released without being tried for the alleged theft of a backpack. Id. 6 Udi Ofer, Kalief Browder's Tragic Death and the Criminal Injustice of Our Bail System, ACLU (Mar. 15, 2017) https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakfreely/kalief-browders-tragic-death-and-criminal-injustice-our-bail-system. the opportunity for bail. 7 Browder remained on Riker's Island for three years, spending more than 400 days in solitary confinement. 8 Browder's case was eventually dismissed and the charges were dropped, but at age twenty-two, suffering from depression following his release, Browder committed suicide. 9 While Browder's story has been widely shared as a cautionary tale depicting a tenuous U.S. criminal justice system, his story is often told with a focus on the tribulations of solitary confinement. 10 While solitary confinement is a serious issue which needs reform, the root of the problem--what placed Browder in Riker's in the first place--was an excessive bail amount. Browder's story is indicative of a class of similarly situated inmates who deserve a reasonable interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's excessive bail clause, 11 in addition to significant bail reform. 12 While numbers vary, it is estimated that over 450,000 people in the United States are detained while awaiting their trial solely due to their inability to afford bail. 13 Importantly, a majority of pretrial detainees are held at the municipal or county level.
14 While the federal government has passed legislation to decrease pretrial detention numbers, 15 municipal and county jails continue to overflow with defendants who are held simply because they cannot make bail. 16 Further compounding the problem is the disparity across various counties 11 The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 12 See generally Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=0 (discussing the long-term damage bail inflicts on vulnerable defendants and the need for reform). 13 Id. , https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/New_Jersey_Jail_ Population_Analysis_March_2013.pdf (finding 73.3 percent of the New Jersey jail population to be detained pretrial and about 38.5 percent of the total population to be held because they could not make bail).
15 Establishment of Pretrial Services, 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (2008). 16 Pinto states as follows: [Of the 2.2 million people currently locked up in this country, fewer than one in 10 is being held in a federal prison. Far more are serving time in state prisons, and nearly three-quarters of a million aren't in prison at all but in local city and county jails. Of those in jails, 60 percent haven't been convicted of anything. They're innocent in the eyes of the law, awaiting resolution in their cases. Some of these inmates are being held because they're considered dangerous or unlikely to return to court for their hearings. But many of them simply cannot afford to pay the bail that has been set]. Pinto, supra note 12.
and states in how judicial officers determine bail amounts. 17 This disparity has been exacerbated by the Supreme Court's lack of uniformity and guiding precedent.
18
Legislatively enacted bail policies, particularly "bail schedules," have also contributed to the wide discrepancy in how pretrial bail is assigned.
19 Also referred to as "bail schemes," these schedules are procedural schemes that provide judges with standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual defendant. These schedules might formally be promulgated through state law, or informally employed by local officials. They may be mandatory or merely advisory, and may provide minimum sums, maximum sums, or a range of sums to be imposed for each crime. Even in jurisdictions with bail schemes that give explicit discretion to judicial officers and pretrial service agencies (PSAs), arrestees have alleged that arbitrary bail procedures have replaced the courts' obligation to make case-by-case bail assignments and has resulted in a "wealth-based detention system." 21 This Note argues that courts have strayed from their duty to make individualized bail determinations and consequently, frequently impose excessive bail amounts. This Note suggests that the current excessive bail epidemic in the United States stems from a lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding the Eighth Amendment's excessive bail clause 22 and also suggests that lower courts have misapplied what little precedent the Supreme Court has set on this matter. 23 Circuit courts and legal commentators have acknowledged the lack of clarity and confusion that the Supreme Court's interpretation has provided. 24 This opacity has caused a split among courts and has left a gray area for legal practitioners in understanding how much discretion legislatures and judicial officers have in assigning bail. 25 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE
A. Origins of "Excessive Bail"
The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment has its origins in the English Bill of Rights. 26 The phrase the English used in 1689 read, "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 27 The right was included in English law after excessive bails were imposed by King James II as a method of indefinitely imprisoning "politically disfavored individuals." 28 Monetary bail originated as a surety that the accused would stand trial and as a begins-with-the-bench.html?_r=0 (setting $550,000 bail for a nineteen-year-old Baltimore juvenile held in adult jail although his GPS tracking records showed the defendant was not in the vicinity of the crime when committed), 
B. Bail Traditions in the United States
The ambiguity of the English clause was imported into U.S. law at the time of the country's founding. 31 Prior to the enactment of the Eighth Amendment, various colonial charters instituted "right to bail" and "excessive bail" clauses. 32 Colonial founders incorporated the English excessive bail clause into colonial constitutions as an inalienable right. 33 The Framers codified the federal right to be free from excessive bail in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and in the Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights later that year. 34 The 33 Hegreness, supra note 31, at 912 ("In state constitutions, from the Founding through the Nixon era, the right to bail was automatic and inalienable for all crimes not punishable by death."). 34 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. ("And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted except where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, and of the evidence, and the usages of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 35 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
continually confounded the Court, lower courts, and state legislatures.
Stack v. Boyle
Boyle remains the only Supreme Court case questioning an excessive bail amount and arrestees' bail assignment procedures. The petitioners in Boyle were charged as Communists in violation of the Smith Act. 36 They argued that they were subjected to excessive bail in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. 37 The District Court for the Southern District of California denied the petitioners' motion to reduce bail and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 38 The petitioners then filed applications for habeas corpus and an alternative determination of their bail with the Supreme Court. 39 They argued that the procedure used to assign their bail was unconstitutional because it did not consider the defendants' individual circumstances. 40 In holding that the defendants' bail was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that the bail amounts were exponentially higher than those usually imposed for similar offenses. 41 The Court recognized that, " [s] ince the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant [at trial]. The traditional standards . . . are to be applied in each case to each defendant." 42 The bulk of the eighteen-page Boyle opinion was a concurrence by Justice Jackson who was joined by Justice Frankfurter. 43 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson stated that the use 36 Id. at 3. 37 Id. 46 In Carlson, the majority determined that the Attorney General could refuse bail to a group of alien communists because of their potential threat to society. 47 The Supreme Court issued a divisive five-four decision holding that the Eighth Amendment did not require that bail should always be available. 48 Carlson provided a blueprint of the popular elements now considered by judges and debated by policymakers when adjudicating or legislating bail including issues such as due process, equal protection, and judicial discretion.
49
This closely contested decision created confusion regarding the correct interpretation of the excessive bail clause, shifting the discussion to focus on whether the clause provided a "right to bail" for crimes other than capital punishment. 50 The decision also raised questions regarding how much discretion nonjudicial bodies had in 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (forty-three pages); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (twenty-eight pages). 44 Id. at 9 (Jackson, J.). 45 Hegreness, supra note 31, at 960-69 (describing the Court's complicity in unconstitutional bail practices by upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as constitutional). 46 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 47 Id. at 541-47. 48 Id. at 545-46. 49 See generally id. at 534-36, 542 (discussing the principles of legislative discretion and due process). 50 See id. at 534, 540 (discussing whether a provision under the Internal Security Act could allow the Attorney General to deny bail). legislating bail. 51 However, it is important to distinguish the facts of Carlson from the common facts of current cases which have led to our excessive bail epidemic. Crucially, the Carlson plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the ability to be "continued in custody" 52 without being afforded the opportunity of bail, 53 a different claim than challenging an excessive monetary amount. Additionally, the crimes that the Carlson and Boyle plaintiffs allegedly conducted were far more egregious than those characterized by most current excessive bail cases. 54 Due to these distinctions, Carlson is not analogous to the current cases causing the excessive bail epidemic--cases frequently involving crimes of poverty or low-level misdemeanor offenses. While Carlson is not analogous to many bail cases causing the bail epidemic, courts 51 See id. at 543 (discussing the legislative scheme, which gave the Attorney General, not a judicial officer, the discretion to deny bail in the context of immigration). 52 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 533-34. Because the plaintiffs in Carlson were non-U.S. citizens their bail determination fell under the discretion of the Attorney General through Section 23 of the Internal Security Act, which provides in pertinent part:
[ continue to rely on it as precedent in assigning bail. 55 To end the bail epidemic, courts should lessen their reliance on Carlson when assigning bail.
Bail Reform Acts of 1966 & 1984
The lack of cohesion from the Supreme Court and from local courts across the country ultimately led to an attempt by Congress to provide guidelines on setting bail via the Bail Reform Act ("BRA") of 1966. 56 The BRA established that, when making a bail determination, judicial officers should consider:
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.
57
The BRA was met with immediate resistance as critics viewed it as limiting a court's ability to detain potentially dangerous individuals before trial. 58 Although it was only imposed on the federal courts, some states followed suit with similar statutes, while 55 See, e.g., Rendel v. Mummert, 474 P.2d 824, 826 (Ariz. 1970) (holding there is no constitutional right to bail in all cases); In re Underwood, 508 P.2d 721, 725 (Cal. 1973) ("Our constitutional language expressly providing that all persons shall be bailable except for a capital offense was consciously added to the 'no excessive bail' language adopted from the Eight Amendment in order to make clear that, unlike the federal rule, all except the one class of defendants were to be others decided to craft statutes with a greater explicit focus on dangerousness of the accused in the name of public safety. 59 This disunity eventually led to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 ("1984 Act" T). 60 The 1984 Act revised the BRA to allow courts to impose conditions of release to ensure community safety. 61 The 1984 Act provided: the defendant must be released on their own personal recognizance or unsecured personal bond unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.
62
Prior to this revision, denial of bail was only permitted for the most heinous crimes, such as capital offenses. 63 Since the 1984 Act, courts have been able to deny bail as a preventative measure. 64 
United States v. Salerno
The 1984 Act was swiftly challenged in 1986 in United States v. Salerno. 65 The Salerno petitioners challenged the revised clause in the 1984 Act which added "potential dangerousness" as a consideration for bail, claiming it was a violation of their Due Process rights and their Eighth Amendment right to be free from the denial of bail based on considerations other than the possibility of flight. 66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the petitioners and struck down the provision, declaring it to be facially unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process.
67
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether the 1984 Act was constitutional.
68
In another split decision, the Court determined that the petitioners failed to meet the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the "potential dangerousness" clause in the 1984 Act was facially unconstitutional. 69 The majority opinion, implying that there was no genuine conflict among the Courts of Appeals, 70 solidified a court's ability to refuse bail if the government establishes that the arrestee "pose[s] a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel."
71 Considered a threat to the community, the Salerno petitioners were denied bail. 72 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist claimed, [t]he only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil . . . [and] to determine whether the Government's response is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response. Second, like the serious crimes alleged in Carlson and Boyle, the petitioners in Salerno were accused of being high-ranking members of the notorious Genovese mob family and key proponents of organized crime.
78 This is distinguishable from the petty crimes characteristic of those being held on excessive bail across the 73 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754. 74 Id. at 762. 75 Id. at 760-61 (declaring the majority holding to be "an exercise of obfuscation" and a practice of "mere sophistry"). 76 Id. at 763, 66-68. Justice Stevens did not join Justice Marshall's dissent, but agreed with his conclusion that "the provision of the Bail Reform Act allowing pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness is unconstitutional." Id. at 768. 77 Id. at 744. 78 Id. at 743. country today. 79 Third, the Salerno opinion specifically refused to address when pretrial detention may be so excessively long that it would be "punitive in relation to Congress' regulatory goal." 80 Challenges today pertaining to excessive bail frequently consider how long arrestees are detained pretrial because of an inability to pay bail. 81 The Salerno opinion is also distinguishable because it came at a time when crime rates had been on the rise, whereas today crime rates are decreasing. 82 This officially ended a period of an implied right to pretrial release pending trial and spawned the current culture of pretrial detention as states adopted bail provisions 79 See e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (noting a case where defendant was charged with being a pedestrian under the influence and detained for inability to pay $160 cash bond); Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2016 WL 7337549, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (noting case where defendant was charged with driving with a suspended license and detained for inability to pay $2,500 bail amount). The Sandra Bland case presents another example. In 2015, Bland was arrested for a DUI. Bland was unable to pay $515 or 10 percent (plus a $15 filingfee) of her $5,000 bond, which had been set at such a high amount due to delinquent parking tickets. Bland had just secured employment and intended to pay back the delinquent parking tickets. 20/why-innocentpeople-plead-guilty/ (showing that "in response "to rising crime rates," New York passed the "Rockefeller Laws" in 1973 that "dictated a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for selling just two ounces (or possessing four ounces) of heroin, cocaine, or marijuana"); see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Moynihan, Mass Incarceration, and Responsibility, ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/moynihan-massincarceration-and-responsibility/407131/ ("In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act, the largest crime bill passed in American history. The 1994 Crime Bill, as it has come to be known, is also arguably the federal government's greatest contribution to the moral catastrophe of mass incarceration. It literally funded it. The law funneled money into states that built more prisons and took up 'truth in sentencing' laws that lengthened time served. It had the perverse effect of encouraging the growth of prisons."). 86 46)(c) (noting judge's discretion and setting forth subjective balancing considerations). In 1951, the Supreme Court referred to these elements as broadly as, "having regard to the nature and circumstance of the offense, and of the evidence, and to the usages of law." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951). In 1987, after the BRA was revised to include the considerations of dangerousness, courts shifted their analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) ("To determine whether the Government's response is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response."); Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) ("To determine whether the Excessive Bail Clause has been violated, we look to the valid state interests bail is intended to serve for a particular individual and judge whether bail conditions are excessive for the purpose of achieving those interests."). The Galin court also clarified that, "[t]he state may not set bail to achieve invalid interests . . . nor in an amount that is excessive in relation to the valid interests it seeks to achieve." Galen, 477 F.3d at 660.
were replaced with procedural, formalistic state bail schedules.
89
Bail schedules and other bail schemes are now used in various criminal proceedings across the United States in an attempt at uniformity and a streamlined method of pretrial release. 90 
92 Second, an inability to pay bail assigned by mandatory or strictly followed schedules has led to more pretrial detention. 93 Furthermore, it has been argued that these 89 Carlson, supra note 20, at 13-14 ("Despite the clear legal emphasis on the importance of individualized bail determinations, many U.S. jurisdictions have nevertheless adopted a particular device that represents the antithesis of bail fixed according to the personal characteristics and circumstances of each defendant: the bail schedule."). 90 Id. bail schedules are being followed arbitrarily, resulting in a greater adverse impact on indigent individuals.
94
Pretrial detention solely due to an individual's inability to pay unreasonable monetary bail implicates equal protection and due process concerns, and potentially violates the fundamental presumption of innocence inherent in our criminal justice system.
95
States have implemented an assortment of policies attempting to mitigate these concerns, but these policies are not without accompanying legal challenges.
96
A. Georgia Model
Georgia and the states that follow its example set mandatory minimum bail amounts for felonies and allow counties to create similar bail schedules for misdemeanors 97 to "promote uniformity and fairness, and to facilitate and ensure the early setting of bond [s] . . 95 See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (stating, " [u] nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 554 (1952) (discussing how the discretion to jail someone without bail is a serious one, the Court declared, "[d]elegating and redelegating this dangerous power to subordinates entrusted with duties like those of deputy sheriffs and policemen raises serious procedural due process questions."). 96 See generally Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205 (Haw. 1993) (citing an appeal reversing a trial court judge who believed she would not need to make a finding if she did not deviate from the bail schedule); Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *1 (plaintiff alleging he was held solely because he could not pay the minimum bail schedule); Odonnell, 2016 WL 7337549 at *1 (declaring Harris County's post-arrest procedures create a "wealth-based detention system"). 97 See highlight the expediency they provide, arguing that by having a schedule in place, defendants do not need to wait for a trial court to rule on their bail amount. 99 Similarly, proponents argue that the uniformity of the bail schedule is fair because it provides defendants with expectations of their bail amount and assigns bail based on similar offenses.
100
However, the Georgia model is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's guidance to make bail determinations based on individual circumstances. 101 Additionally, the expediency argument is often in contrast with bail assignments that set a minimum amount unattainable to a defendant strictly because of their disadvantaged financial situation. 102 Finally, because these bail schedules have been evoked so strictly, the Georgia model has also been criticized as a violation of judicial discretion by usurping the judicial officer's opportunity to assign an appropriate bail amount. 103 These types of blanket bail determinations clearly interfere with a judge's discretion to assign bail, and followed strictly, are a violation of constitutional rights to be free from excessive bail.
B. California Model
To avoid interfering with a judicial officer's bail assignment discretion, other states, such as California, provide bail schedules but are explicit in their deference to the judicial officer's assigned amount.
104 These bail schedules typically provide a maximum amount, but do not assign minimums, leaving the final assigned amount to the judicial officer's discretion. 105 In such states, similar arguments are made in favor of uniformity, expectation of expenses, and a judicially efficient process for release.
106
Critics of these methods have focused on how the theoretical benefits provided by bail schedules have receded into a tangible disadvantage impacting traditionally vulnerable communities, resulting in an alleged "wealth-based detention system." 107 The California method has also caused confusion among administrators. 103 to prescheduled bail amounts." 113 The Roberson consent decree requires judges and hearing officers to consider a number of criteria and then determine bail. 114 Under the Roberson order, one of the criteria to be considered is "the ability to make bail," 115 but judges have disproportionately outweighed this factor in favor of others. 116 Ultimately, Hearing Officers in Harris County followed the prescheduled bail amount in 88.9% of misdemeanor cases.
117
These states are praised at least for their requirement to have courts enact the bail schedules and not the legislature. For example, the state of Ohio allows county courts to fix bail based on the surrounding circumstances of a case or "in accordance with a schedule previously fixed by the judge or magistrate."
118 Similarly, Alabama revised its bail statute in January 2017 to allow county judges to consider an individual's financial condition. 119 This revision came after the absence of the clause in an Alabama county statute was challenged for violating the Eighth Amendment. 120 In response, an Alabama court made clear that the use of blanket schedules without regarding a defendant's indigence would be unconstitutional.
121 This is a step in the right direction, but any 113 Odonnell v. Harris Cty, Texas 2017 WL 1735456, at *13 (quoting Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)). For a more in-depth discussion of the "Roberson order" derived from Roberson v. Richardson, see id. at *13-15. 114 Id. at 13-14; Rule 4. Initial Settings, HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURTS at 9-10 (Sept. 6, 2012). 115 Odonnell at 14. 116 Id. at 35 ("The Hearing Officers testified that they cannot let one factorthe inability to pay-control their bail determination. But they frequently cite only one factor-criminal history-as controlling their decision to set secured money bail that the defendant clearly cannot pay."). 117 121 See id. at 4 (The new standard the court announces is that, "[t]he use of a secured bail schedule to detain a person after arrest, without a hearing on the merits that meets the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the person's indigence and the sufficiency of the bail setting, is unconstitutional as applied to the indigent. Without such a hearing, no person may, consistent with dollar-amount bail schedule still detracts from a judicial officer's discretion.
D. Case-by-Case Model
Though the Texas model is a valiant effort, other states' bail procedures are more aligned with the Supreme Court's individualized bail determination standard and the essence of judicial officer discretion. These states typically do not establish bail schedules and instead use general clauses to assign bail based on a set of transcribed circumstances. 122 One such example is New York. New York's bail provision does not adopt a bail schedule, but offers a discretionary standard for a judicial officer which provides a number of criteria to assess in making bail determinations:
With respect to [the arrestee], the court must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure his court attendance when required. In determining that matter, the court must, on the basis of available information, consider and take into account (i) 
A. Progress Through State Bail Reform
Grappling with equitable bail determinations has been a difficult issue for states. 132 Typically, to determine bail when there is no bail schedule in place, the accused-with, or often without, the assistance of counsel-will present factors including the seriousness of the charge, prior criminal history, and the health or well-being of any potential victim. 133 If the accused is bailable-which has traditionally been the case for low-level, misdemeanor offensesthe judicial officer will then consider general background information regarding the accused, whether there are supervisory methods in place if the defendant is released pending trial, and the state's interest in pretrial detention. 134 Using this information, the judicial officer is to make a reasonable bail determination or release the accused on their own recognizance. 135 The subjective nature of this approach has led to varying results at the local level. 136 In attempting to grapple with the issue, states have started to think about innovative alternatives for determining bail, some more praiseworthy than others. The below discussion provides a brief background of how states and communities have used innovative approaches to alleviate the assignment of excessive bail.
Bail Schedules
As discussed, bail schedules were originally seen as a way of standardizing the bail assignment process.
137 Proponents of such procedures argue that they provide a "speedy and convenient" method of release and a financial incentive to comply with the conditions of their release. 138 These bail schedules developed during a boom in the cash bail bond business. 139 Often imposing cash bonds, mandatory bail schedule statutes have required the accused to pay these bonds as a surety that they would stand trial. 140 schedules or schemes were considered an early positive innovation in attempting to achieve equitable bail.
142
While bail schedules may have been viewed as an early attempt at providing more equitable bail determinations, they were largely unsuccessful, resulting in an alleged "wealth-based detention system."
143 An inability to pay these often-mandatory amounts has led to several further innovations in bail reform. For example, and further indicating the monetary role bail has played in criminal justice, "bail funds" have recently been created to alleviate the burden of excessive bail amounts. 
Bail Funds
Bail funds allow individuals to pool their money together to pay for the bail of those who would otherwise be detained pretrial.
145
The governing rules of bail funds vary, but their general purpose is the same: they are created to pay for the release of low-risk defendants.
146 Once a defendant who has been sponsored by the 142 See generally OKLAHOMAN, supra note 90 (examining how counties in Oklahoma have different bail practices). 143 147 These funds are typically created by municipalities who finance them by appropriating a part of the public budget, or are funded through community groups who raise money from their peers and whose members make personal contributions to the fund. 148 Municipal legislators claim that the use of public money is wellspent because of the typically high cost of detaining an inmate. 149 Additionally, at least one criminal justice scholar has argued that community bail funds should be seen as a means of nullification, arguing that "[e]ach time a community bail fund pays bail for a stranger, the people in control of the fund reject a judge's determination that a certain amount of the defendant's personal money was necessary for the defendant's release."
150 This type of grassroots organizing and civil auditing should be an indication to the courts that excessive bail has a substantial impact on the community at large. Though helpful, bail funds are only a solution for providing financial assistance for those low-risk defendants eligible after bail has already been imposed-these funds do not , http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/new-york-city-bail-relieflow-level-detainees-limbo-article-1.2898723 (declaring that the NYC fund has not distributed any money to detainees a year after its creation). 149 See Surico, supra note 148 (claiming it costs $450 per day to detain an NYC inmate and the average pretrial inmate stay is 24 days). 150 Simonson, supra note 146, at 588.
address the problem of why excessive bails are so often imposed in the first place. Attempting to make more accurate bail assignments, some states have turned to bail algorithms.
Bail Algorithms
Bail algorithms, through computer programming, assess questions answered by an arrestee and use that analysis in conjunction with the arrestee's criminal record to recommend a riskanalysis of the arrestee. 151 Bail algorithms are geared toward more accurately determining bail amounts based on a number of factors traditionally left to judges' discretion. 152 Representatives from the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which has created a bail algorithm used in thirty jurisdictions, have justified it as a way "to provide judges with objective, data-driven, consistent information that can inform the decisions [judicial officers] make." 153 Through machine learning, the Arnold Foundation bail algorithm is able to process data from 1.5 million case histories, as well as other information, and then provide predictive risk-assessments pertaining to a defendant's likelihood of recidivism or missing trial.
algorithms have already been criticized by legal commentators and practitioners. 156 It is argued that bail algorithms not only limit the discretion of the judicial officer and prescribe bail amounts that are excessive by traditional standards, but in some circumstances they have also been considered biased toward certain races.
157 These algorithms do not use race in their evaluation explicitly, but do consider factors which, in practice, impact specific races. 158 As such, these algorithms, while providing informed data, still result in inaccurate bail determinations and the assignment of excessive bail.
159 While enduring criticism, bail algorithms can at least be seen as a positive step toward case-by-case bail determinations.
Pretrial Services
Furthering efforts to make case-by-case determinations while simultaneously attempting to make bail attainable has been the development of Pretrial Service Agencies ("PSAs"). 160 PSAs are nationwide implementation include, transparency, data-fetching, and ethical issues). 156 , https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-analgorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/ (noting that ProPublica, allege that the COMPAS algorithm is "biased against black defendants"). 158 See Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 157 ("For example, black defendants are more likely to have prior arrests, and since prior arrests predict reoffending, the algorithm flags more black defendants as high risk even though it does not use race in the classification."). 159 Tashea, supra note 151. 160 See Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventative Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, governmental agencies designed to aid judicial officers, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in making more accurate bail requests and generally increasing the efficiency of pretrial procedures. 161 The general responsibilities of a PSA are the same: they provide support through mechanisms such as recommendations to the court after interviews with the defendant, risk assessments, and defendant supervision. 162 These services have been proven to lead to more accurately assigned bail amounts, have made bail more attainable for alleged defendants, and have increased trial efficiency. 163 In addition to improving the desired effects of bail, pretrial services have lowered the cost of pretrial inmate detention. 164 A study by the U.S. courts showed that in 2012, pretrial detention cost $73.03 per day, but pretrial supervision cost the government $7.24 per day. 165 Similarly, a 2012 study issued for California County Courts showed that Santa Clara County's Pretrial Service Program saved them $32 million per year. 166 Thus, since their inception, localities have used pretrial services as a method of keeping pretrial detention inmate numbers low, lowering budget costs, and increasing trial attendance rates. 167 Pretrial services are not a new innovation, and may be traced back to the Manhattan Bail Project and the beginning of the bail 97 Yale L.J. 320, 321 (1987); see also Marimow, supra note 93 (detailing the procedures in D.C. courts aimed at progressing pretrial release). 161 Woodruff, supra note 134 at 253. 162 See id. 163 See Marimow, supra note 93 (discussing the statistical accomplishments of Washington, D.C.'s pretrial release services program, in lieu of a monetary bail program, with respect to trial attendance of criminal defendants released on nonfinancial bail). 164 See generally P'SHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, PRETRIAL DETENTION & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION--BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (Sharon Aungst ed., 2012) (describing lowered costs in California County jails that have strong pretrial service practices); Supervision Costs, supra note 109 (detailing the sharp decrease in spending by using pretrial service techniques).
165 Supervision Costs, supra note 109. 166 P'SHIP FOR CMTY. EXCELLENCE, supra note 164, at 4. 167 See VERA INST. JUST., supra note 14, at iv-v.
reform movement. 168 From 1960 to 1967, the Manhattan Bail Project researched the impact of pretrial services and their effect on ensuring a defendant's appearance at trial. 169 Their research clearly showed that pretrial services were more impactful than monetary bail assignments. 170 Because of their success, pretrial services are now required at the federal level, 171 but have mostly failed to trickle down to counties and municipalities. 172 States which do provide such services typically allow counties to administer them on their own, which has led to a general lack of cohesion. an appropriate opportunity to be heard. 175 Furthermore, some criminal justice advocates have spoken out about the invasiveness of pretrial services which frequently require adherence to drug testing or GPS monitoring. 176 This has been criticized as a method of policing a population in their homes or communities rather than in jail--often at the arrestee's expense. 177 Although criticized, 178 pretrial services are beneficial because they provide judicial officers with detailed circumstances of each defendant's case so they may make more accurate bail determinations. Thus, pretrial services go a long way in ensuring excessive bail amounts are not imposed and--when administered successfully--pretrial service administrators can pride themselves on not detaining alleged criminals simply because they cannot pay. 179 The success of PSAs has led bail reform advocates to push for such agencies in all states.
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B. Clarity Through Supreme Court Intervention
Alone, these innovations will not end the excessive bail epidemic. As noted above, bail reform advocates and legal commentators have declared that state bail procedures violate the administration of justice for a multitude of reasons. 181 These state procedural schemes have been the subject of several legal challenges, and recent rulings have suggested a positive shift towards recognizing bail reform. 182 For example, in 2015, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a statement of interest ("SOI") in Varden v. City of Clanton. 183 The DOJ argued that the city's use of a mandatory bail scheme, without consideration for indigence, violated the Fourteenth Amendment and was contrary to public policy. 184 The plaintiffs' argument emphasized the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection, particularly as it pertains to pretrial liberty. 185 The City of Clanton reacted to arden's claims by revising its mandatory bail schedule provision to consider indigence. 186 Alabama then revised its state statute to specifically account for defendants' financial condition when assigning bail. 187 However, as litigation and legislation moves forward, those unable to pay bail remain in wait. Reforms have been furthered by states through legislative action and legal challenges, 188 but without a Supreme Court ruling defining the prohibitions on excessive bail, courts throughout the country will continue to interpret this clause arbitrarily at worst, and inconsistently at best.
To date, the only Supreme Court case to consider an excessive bail amount is Stack, in which the Court ruled that the blanket procedure used to determine bail was a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause. 189 In Stack and the cases that followed, the Court failed to establish an appropriate test, yet mentioned in dicta that " [t] o infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act" 190 and that "[i]f bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed for serious charges is required in the case of any [arrestee] , that is a matter to which evidence should be directed in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each [arrestee] may be preserved." 191 The Court remanded the case for the lower court to fix "reasonable bail" but did not identify factors to determine such reasonableness. 192 Thus, in an effort to prevent "flood[ing] the courts with motions and appeals in bail cases," 193 and by narrowly responding to the legal questions before them, 194 the Court failed to establish appropriate excessive bail precedent. 
Walker v. City of Calhoun
On September 3, 2015, the Calhoun Police Department arrested fifty-four-year-old Maurice Walker for "being a pedestrian under the influence." 199 Walker, who is disabled, had been living on just $540 per month in Social Security benefits. 200 Unable to afford the mandatory $160 cash bond, Maurice stayed in jail for six days prior 196 Stack, 342 U.S. at 13 (Jackson, J.) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court granted certiorari in Salerno "because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. This conflict is persistent today and warrants clarity by the Court. 197 See Odonnell, 2016 WL 7337549 at *8 ("According to a 2012 report, 81 percent of misdemeanor arrestees in Harris County could not post bail at booking and were jailed. Most of the other 19 percent could pay and were released on bond before or at booking."); see also Pinto, supra note 12 (describing the impact detention on bail has on the innocent and indigent). 198 The Supreme Court will rarely remove a case before an appeals court opinion is issued. They will only do so "upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination [ to appearing in front of a Municipal Court judge. 201 Maurice filed a class action lawsuit and asked the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to determine whether the city's mandatory bail schedule violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 202 The district court granted standing to Walker's class 203 and found that the bail schedule violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not account for indigence. 204 The court issued an injunction to cease the use of the bail schedule. 205 It also mandated that the city "implement postarrest procedures that comply with the Constitution." 206 The court definitively stated that the City of Calhoun "may not continue to keep arrestees in its custody for any amount of time solely because the arrestees cannot afford bail." 207 A Supreme Court ruling of this nature would greatly impact and possibly end the use of bail schedules in counties across the country.
In February 2017, the Eleventh Circuit granted an appeal by the City of Calhoun and ruled in the City's favor, vacating the district court's order because it did not comport with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 65 (requiring an injunction to be sufficiently specific and detailed). 208 Because the circuit court remanded the case for lack of specificity, they did not address the constitutionality of the City of Calhoun's bail schedule procedures; however, in their appeal, the City of Calhoun argued that strict scrutiny review does not apply to an indigent class and that the bail schedule in place is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 209 The appellants also claimed that "principles of Federalism afford municipalities the flexibility to employ different pretrial procedures" and that the city's practices are within that flexible boundary. 210 Finally, the City argued that their legislature-imposed bail schedule did not interfere with the discretion of the judicial officer in setting bail amounts.
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The City of Calhoun was joined by "interested parties" such as neighboring municipalities in Georgia, as well as organizations like the Georgia Sherriff's Association, the American Bail Coalition, and Bail USA, Inc. 212 On the appellee's side, "interested parties" providing amicus briefs or representation were groups such as the Department of Justice, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Cato Institute, and the Pretrial Justice Institute. 213 The sheer number of interested parties on both sides and the dire circumstances of the appellee-plaintiffs should indicate the importance of supervision by the Supreme Court. 214 The Court should answer several important questions pertaining to excessive bail, such as: (1) whether mandatory bail schedules are per se unconstitutional, (2) whether judicial officers must consider the financial status of a defendant when fixing bail, and (3) whether legislatively enacted bail schedules infringe upon a judicial officer's discretion. 215 
Odonnell v. Harris County, Texas
In Odonnell, a more recent case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the joint plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after being held on bail amounts that ranged 209 from $2,500 to $5,000. 216 None of the plaintiffs were able to pay, and were detained between two and five days prior to their bail hearings. 217 Odonnell raises many analogous themes to Walker and Varden, 218 but has also raised distinct questions of law important to excessive bail jurisprudence. 219 The arrestees in Odonnell argued that their bail was assigned at amounts much higher than they were able to pay, creating a "wealthbased detention system." 220 Harris County-home of one of the largest municipal jails in the United States and infamous for overcrowding-first argued for a stay until they could implement bail reforms set to begin in July 2017. 221 The district court judge dismissed Harris County's motion, and issued an early ruling in favor of the plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims. 222 In April 2017, leaving little risk to be overruled due to a lack of specificity and detail, Judge Lee H. Rosenthal issued a 193-page opinion in favor of the Odonnell plaintiff class, establishing an injunction on Harris County's bail practices. 223 Judge Rosenthal's lengthy ruling attempted to answer a narrow question pertaining to the circumstances of the plaintiff's case. The ruling only addressed misdemeanor offenses committed by indigent individuals who were detained pretrial solely due to an inability to afford a monetary bail amount. 224 The opinion issued an injunction on the county's bail practices and ordered the release of any such person who was being held. 225 The county appealed the decision and filed a motion to stay the injunction while on appeal. 226 The county then filed an emergency review with Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, who denied the request, allowing the injunction to go into effect. 227 Given the hotly contested issues in the case, it is likely the appellants may still seek Supreme Court review pending appeal, and the Court should grant certiorari. 228 Intervention by the Supreme Court would allow the Justices to address questions such as: (1) the standard of review for indigent individuals bringing equal protection claims, 229 (2) the extent pretrial hearings must go to adhere to procedural due rocess standards in determining bail, 230 and (3) the federal courts' requirement to abstain from hearing challenges to bail cases. 
Accurately Defining Excessive Bail
Most importantly, the Court should take the opportunity to use both cases to provide clear guidelines regarding how to define "excessive bail." An adequate resolution of these issues would rule that mandatory bail schedules are per se unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent. In Stack, Justice Jackson, in his concurrence, declared that it was a clear violation of FRCP 46(c) if a court fixes a "uniform blanket bail" based on the nature of the accusation and without considering "the difference in circumstances between different defendants." 232 Justice Jackson went on to state, "[e]ach defendant stands before the bar of justice as an individual;" 233 because mandatory bail schedules do not provide the defendant with that opportunity, they should be ruled per se unconstitutional. 234 If mandatory bail schedules are ruled per se unconstitutional, the onus will likely shift again toward judicial discretion in assigning reasonable bail. 235 Bail schemes are justifiable in assisting judicial officers making bail determinations, but the Supreme Court should clarify that these schemes must allow the judicial officer to consider individual defendants' financial status, among other factors, and that the judicial officer--not the legislature--has the ultimate discretion in assigning bail. 236 Under this interpretation, courts would find that the City of Calhoun, Harris County, and similar jurisdictions using rigid fixed bail procedures, or informal arbitrary ones, do not provide adequate means for indigent individuals to be released within a reasonable amount of time.
237 This is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection because an inability to pay an excessive bail causes a de facto detention which is a deprivation of liberty and impairs a defendant's presumption of innocence.
Defendants' impaired presumption of innocence and a deterioration of their right to be free pending trial are precisely what Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Black and Marshall warned of in Stack, Carlson, and Salerno. 238 In Stack, Chief Justice Vinson wrote "[the] traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." 239 In Carlson, Justice Black declared, "[t]he plain purpose of our bail Amendment was to make it impossible [for any agency] to authorize keeping people imprisoned a moment longer than was necessary." 240 And in Salerno, Justice Marshall poignantly wrote, 236 See, e.g., FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE, supra note 105 (showing a Los Angeles County bail schedule which requires certain minimum amounts but also provides "the amount of bail . . . shall lie with the sound discretion of the judicial officer before whom the defendant appeared"). 237 See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *10. 238 See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("Unless [the] right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring "[t]he majority's untenable conclusion that the present Act is constitutional arises from a specious denial of the role of the Bail Clause and the Due Process Clause in protecting the invaluable guarantee afforded by the presumption of innocence."). See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 552 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) ("For the bureau agent is not required to prove that a person he throws in jail is an alien, or a Communist, or 'dangerous.' The agent need only declare he has reason to believe that such is the case. The agent may be and here apparently was acting on the rankest hearsay evidence."). 239 Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. 240 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 557.
[h]onoring the presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we must pay substantial social costs as a result of our commitment to the values we espouse. But at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves.
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Even Justice Rehnquist--one of the most conservative Justices to sit on the bench--wrote that bail conditions should be balanced against "the individual's strong interest in liberty."
242 Justice Rehnquist, with whom the entire bench agreed, went on to declare that an individual's liberty may only be deprived "in circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty" as shown by clear and convincing evidence.
243 Individuals such as Kalief Browder, Maurice Walker, and Maranda Odonnell are being detained not for a "sufficiently weighty" government interest proven by clear and convincing evidence; they are detained because a failure in our judicial machinery has resulted in the imposition of excessive bail amounts. This failure warrants clarification from the Supreme Court, which should build upon the meager balancing test of the Salerno Court.
In Salerno, the Court also agreed that a substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that a "proposed condition of release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil," and to determine an excessive response:
[the Court] must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more.
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To more appropriately adjudicate the Excessive Bail Clause, the Supreme Court should refine this definition and declare that:
241 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 767. 242 Id. at 750. 243 Id. 244 Id. at 754.
Where the Government has not shown a compelling interest in pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence, bail must be set at an amount that should ensure appearance at trial and may not be set in a manner and at an amount that is unreasonable when considering a defendant's financial status. In establishing a monetary amount, it is necessary for judicial officers to consider financial status and not impose an amount or condition which would result in an undue burden upon the defendant. 245 Such a test would ensure that courts would account for an individual's financial condition when considering postarrest bail assignments, a requirement under the plain language of the excessive bail clause. This would also ensure arrestees are not detained simply because they cannot afford bail, preserving their presumption of innocence and not restricting their defense.
CONCLUSION
Reasonable bail policies are a key component to reform in the criminal justice system. 246 As such, the administration of bail has developed over the years through advocacy from criminal justice groups, legislative action, common law, and inadequate constitutional interpretation. 247 To appropriately address this ill, the Supreme Court should unequivocally rule that mandatory bail schedules are unconstitutional. The Court should also set a higher standard for legislatively enacted bail procedures, one that ensures judicial officers have the discretion to make accurate bail determinations.
248 245 A ruling such as this is in line with other equal protection and due process standards. 246 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (granting the petition for certiorari to review "questions important to the administration of justice"). 247 See generally Helanie Greenfield, Bail, 79 GEO. L.J. 822 (discussing statues that impose pretrial detention). 248 To make such determinations, judicial officers will likely require as much information pertaining to the defendant as necessary. To provide such information, jurisdictions should implement or improve Pretrial Service Agencies ("PSAs"). Once bail amounts have been made more attainable, more conservative Pretrial detention solely due to an inability to post bail tends to unjustly perpetuate criminality and poverty. 249 Pressures from pretrial detention not only have an impact because of a financial burden to pay bail amounts, but can also lead to loss of employment, housing, or even child custody. 250 Additionally burdensome is the adverse impact an individual's detention has in pursuit of their defense. 251 For the accused, pretrial detention constrains legal representation 252 and vitiates a presumption of innocence. 253 Thus, indigent detainees frequently face an uphill battle for their defense in a system that incentivizes them to admit guilt in exchange for their release. 254 states are likely to raise the debate regarding how much discretion states have in defining bailable and unbailable alleged offenses. Because states have traditionally had the discretion to define bailable and unbailable alleged offenses, and because federal law pertaining to bail is seen as more liberal than state law, there is likely to be a shift toward making more offenses unbailable. 255 California has introduced legislation that would practically abolish monetary bail 256 and judges, while still receiving public pressure, 257 are taking a stance against the arbitrary use of bail schedules by municipal officials. 258 As advocates continue to make progress, it is important that the Supreme Court use its supervisory power to establish a clear precedent for excessive bail.
To borrow a line of reasoning from Chief Justice Roberts, the way to stop the imposition of excessive bail is to stop imposing excessive bail. 259 Until the Supreme Court administers a definitive interpretation of the excessive bail clause, this responsibility rests with judicial officers in municipal and county courts across the country. Unfortunately for many indigent defendants today, detention prior to trial or without trial is the norm, and pretrial liberty is the carefully limited exception. 260 As predicted by Justice Marshall, the Salerno decision truly "[went] forth without authority,
